Up until about 10 years ago I accepted that it was the atomic bombs that had forced the surrender of Japan in August 1945. It was about a decade ago that I first heard the argument advanced in this book, which is that the Soviet Union’s entry into the war had a bigger effect in bringing about Japan’s surrender.The book’s title comes from the notion that Stalin and Truman were racing each other over defeating Japan. Earlier in the Pacific War, eventual Soviet participation had been seen by the US as a way of shortening the war and saving American lives. But by the summer of 1945 Japan had been brought to its knees, and the USA had played by far the biggest role in achieving that outcome (just as the USSR had played by far the biggest role in defeating Nazi Germany). The US no longer felt the Soviet Union would be of much assistance in defeating Japan, and having seen the fate of Eastern Europe, no longer wanted that assistance either. By contrast, Stalin wanted to keep the war going long enough to move his armies from Europe to the Far East and join in, something which would allow him to grab territory from the Japanese. Stalin knew all about the Bomb from his spies within the Manhattan Project, and was desperate to get involved in the war before the Americans forced Japan to surrender.By this time the Japanese leadership was divided into “peace” and “war” factions, the latter dominated by the Army. The war faction’s tactic at this stage was to resist the invasion of the Japanese homeland in a way that would cause the Americans very heavy casualties. It was hoped this would upset American public opinion to the extent the US would eventually agree to a negotiated settlement, with the Soviet Government acting as a mediator. It’s not inconceivable that this tactic might have worked, had the US been forced to launch a ground invasion.The above strategy received two major shocks in August 45, the first of which was the Hiroshima bomb. The author argues though, that the Soviet Union’s entry into the war caused the complete wreckage of the war faction’s plans. Not only did Japan now have another formidable enemy to fight, but it raised the possibility of the USSR having a share in the occupation of the country, a frightening prospect.The book is intensively researched and well-argued. Personally I feel the arguments are persuasive without being completely conclusive. If you are thinking of reading the book, be aware this is not a military history, rather a history of the diplomatic manoeuvrings of the period. I would say that I found the first half a bit of a dry read. The last chapter rehearses a series of counterfactual arguments. The author concludes that, without the atomic bombs, the Soviet entry into the war would have prompted a Japanese surrender, but the reverse situation would not have ended the war in August 1945. Just how many atomic bombs it would have taken to force a Japanese surrender is a question that cannot be answered.Thought-provoking though a bit dry in parts. A 7/10 rating for me, rounded up to four stars.